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Abstract.
This chapter introduces the economics and identity literature, and discusses the relationship
between social identity and personal identity. It distinguishes categorical and relational types of
social identities, and argues that the former are more readily associated with instrumentally
rational behavior, while the latter, which involve close contact with others in roles and social
positions, are more readily associated with behavior in which individuals unilaterally reciprocate
the actions of others – what Bruni terms unilateral altruism, which involves a non-instrumental or
deontological type of motivation. The chapter also distinguishes two views of personal identity
as relational in nature, Bachrach’s game-theoretic approach and one based on collective
intentionality theory, and concludes by arguing that the Homo economicus view of personal
identity is circular.
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1. Introduction: Economics and Identity
The concept of identity has begun to be employed only relatively recently in economics, and
accordingly still lacks a standard meaning and established set of applications in the subject.
However, in its most influential initial uses by Amartya Sen (1999) and George Akerlof and
Rachel Kranton (2000) it has been developed largely in terms of the concept of social identity
(though in quite different ways). Social identity as understood in social psychology (cf. Brown,
2000), where the concept was influentially developed by Erik Erikson in connection with his
idea of an identity crisis (Erikson, 1950), concerns individuals’ ‘identification with’ social
groups of which they are members. There are different ways of understanding the idea of
‘identification with,’ with both more psychological and sociological types of interpretations, but
generally it means that individuals treat the characteristics of the social group with which they
identify as their own individual characteristics, for example, as when people think of themselves
as individuals as having a certain nationality, gender, or religion. Akerlof and Kranton, then,
adopt this sort of understanding when they rewrite the standard utility function representation of
the individual to include a vector of self-images which people are said to have in virtue of their
having corresponding characteristics associated with certain social groups. Sen employs the
same idea that social group characteristics and social identities are applied to individuals and
influence how they think of themselves, but in contrast he also argues that individuals deliberate
over whether to embrace these assignments.
Understanding the concept of identity primarily in terms of social identity, however, creates a
problem in that it leaves unexplained ‘who’ it is that identifies with social groups (Kirman and
Teschl, 2004). Since social identity is understood in terms of the idea of ‘identification with’
others, it follows that we also need to be able to say what the individual’s identity is ‘apart from’
others. Indeed, if the concept of identity is only explained in terms of the concept of social
identity, then since individuals have many social identities, they must fragment across their many
social identities, and have no distinct unitary identities as individuals. This is inconsistent with
referring to them as individuals. Philosophers consequently address the idea that individuals are
distinct unitary beings by focusing on the different concept of personal identity (Noonan, 2003).
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Though there are many issues this leads them to investigate within this framework, in general the
concept personal identity is understood to concern characteristics that makes a person distinct
from others, perhaps enduringly so. Nonetheless, this is not incompatible with an individual
having a collection of social identities, and indeed one way in which an individual could be said
to have a distinct personal identity would be to say that the individual is made up of a unique
combination of different social identities. In any case, given that people can have multiple social
identities, and given that economists treat people as individuals having social identities, it seems
incumbent upon them to explain how their view of the individual relates social identity to
personal identity (Davis, 2003).
Another issue that economics’ employment of the concept of social identity brings up concerns
the behavioral implications of individuals having social identities and moreover of having
multiple social identities. This is particularly important to the topic of philanthropy, reciprocity,
and social enterprise – all ways in which people are other-regarding and orient towards others –
since not only can people’s orientation towards others be understood as a reflection of their
identification with them, but differences between the different ways people have of orienting
towards others can be understood in terms of the different kinds of social identities people have.
Note, then, that when social psychologists investigate people’s different kinds of social
identities, they generally distinguish between “(i) those that derive from interpersonal
relationships and interdependence with specific others and (ii) those that derive from
membership in larger, more impersonal collectives or social categories” (Brewer and Gardner,
1996; Brewer 2001). This can be understood to mean that individuals have social identities that
are “identifications of the self as a certain kind of person” – a role-based social identity – and
they also have social identities involving “identifications of the self with a group or category as a
whole” – a collective social identity (Thoits and Virsup, 1997, p. 106). Thus broadly speaking
people’s social identities can be classified as being relational or categorical. They are relational
when a person occupies occupy a position in a “relational web” (kinship, friendship, patronclient, team member, etc.), and socially identifies with another person or set of people to whom
they are connected in this relational setting in a specific kind of way. They are categorical in
regard to their “sharing some categorical attribute” with other like people (race, ethnicity,
gender, age, disability, language, class, nationality, sexual orientation, etc.) when a person
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socially identifies with another person as representative of that shared category (Brubaker and
Cooper, 2000, pp. 15ff). One way, then, in which philanthropy, reciprocity, and social enterprise
can be investigated in economics is by asking how individuals’ behavior and orientation towards
others varies according to whether they identify socially with them in a relational or categorical
way. This perspective links up with previous question of how personal identity and social
identity are connected, since an orientation ‘towards’ others – a matter of social identity –
presupposes the individual having such an orientation – a matter of personal identity. The
following section consequently looks more closely at how individuals’ orientation towards others
can be understood in overall identity terms when we differentiate between the different kinds of
social identities individuals have, focusing specifically on the concept of reciprocity and the
different ways in which it can be explained.

2.

Identity and Reciprocity

Economics chiefly explains an individual’s orientation towards others in terms of the idea of
other-regarding or social preferences, framing this in terms of standard instrumental rationality
theory in which individuals act in order to maximize utility. On this view, when individuals act
on their social preferences, they gain utility when others are better off. However, this analysis is
limited in what it can explain about the nature of reciprocity, since it implies that reciprocity is
always conditional in nature in that a person only reciprocates the actions of others when in
expectation of a private utility payoff. That is, by relying on standard rationality theory it leaves
out all non-instrumentally rational reciprocal behavior which, as Luigino Bruni puts it, is
unconditional in nature and not motivated by an expectation of a private payoff (Bruni, 2008). In
such cases, the individual unilaterally reciprocates the action of another – a type of action which
is ordinarily associated with altruism. Proponents of standard rationality theory generally deny
such actions are rational, and reject the entire idea that people can be non-instrumentally rational,
but this requires that they re-interpret and reformulate the testimony many people commonly
express regarding this sort of ‘selfless’ behavior, in order to fit it into the standard view.
Debates, however, over whether this is a reasonable strategy and about what rationality involves
can be interminable, and so here the different ways in which reciprocity can be understood are
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tied to the different ways in which people have social identities to see what this can tell us.
Specifically, it will be argued that categorical social identities can generally be better explained
in terms of instrumentally rational reciprocity behavior, while relational social identities often
(but not always) need to be explained in terms of a non-instrumentally rational kind of behavior.
Consider, then, the nature of the social distance between people involved in the two types of
social identities, and also note that when people identify with a social group, they are actually
identifying with other individuals in that social group through their membership in it. Here the
idea of social distance may be taken to refer to degree of familiarity one has with a person with
whom one identifies. Though there are many ways of explaining the idea of familiarity, one
important aspect of it is the extent to which a person actually sees, has contact with, or
personally interacts with another person. At one extreme, then, there are people with whom an
individual identifies who they never see, have contact with, or interact with; at the other extreme,
there are people whom a person regularly sees, has contact with, and interacts with. Thus taking
identification with social groups to be a proxy for identification with individuals in those social
groups, we can distinguish between categorical and relational social identities according to
whether this involves close or distant contact. In the case of categorical social identities, clearly
social distance is great and contact limited; in the case of relational social identities there is less
social distance and much more contact. For example, if one is of a certain nationality – a
categorical social identity – there are usually millions of individuals with whom one identifies
who one has never met nor ever will and who one only knows in the most abstract, representative
sort of way. Alternatively, if one occupies a particular role or position in a family, community
organization, business, or social network – a relational social identity – there are not very many
people with whom one identifies, and for those with whom one identifies one has specific types
of relationships which are understood in terms of regular as well as quite specific forms of
interaction that one has with them.
Relational social identities, then, tend to be tied to established, customary, institutionalized, and
rule-driven types of interaction between people. We need to understand people relationally when
we see this in this capacity, and understand them in terms of social structures. Categorical social
identities, in contrast, tend to be individualizing in the sense that each person having a given
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identity is equally and in the same way a member of the set of all people having that social
identity. They are in part social statistical artifacts and in part social organizational in nature.
But because they apply homogeneously, there is generally nothing in the way in which people
have categorical social identities that distinguishes one individual from the next, whereas people
who share relational social identities are heterogeneous and distinguished from one another
according to the ways in which they have them, reflecting their different positions and roles in
the associated social groups on which these identities depend. This difference thus points to an
important difference between the kinds of behavior people exhibit in connection with these
different kinds of social identity. In the case of relational identities, the fact that people occupy
positions and roles means that their behavior is considerably more circumscribed by what they
ought to do in those contexts in comparison with what is implied by their having categorical
social identities. They also know what they ought to do according to what their circumstances
dictate, and thus rely to an important degree on a non-instrumental rationality. This may also be
true in important ways with respect to categorical social identities, in that a sense of obligation
applies there also to membership in large social groups, though given the less structured way in
which this sort of social identity operates, more space remains for instrumentally rational
decision-making.
This all accordingly allows us to distinguish different kinds of reciprocity, or at least a spectrum
of forms of reciprocity associated with a spectrum of social identities. What Robert Trivers
(1971) originally labeled ‘reciprocal altruism’ then gets placed at the end of the spectrum where
instrumental rationality theory best applies, and what Bruni (2008) contrasts as a unilateral
altruism best applies where rationality is non-instrumental or deontological in nature (meaning in
particular that it reflects a sense of obligation). Somewhere along this spectrum one would also
want to include conceptions of reciprocity such as the much debated ‘strong reciprocity’ concept
(e.g., Gintis, 2000; Fehr, Fischbacher, and Gächter, 2002). At the same time, we may draw a
general conclusion about the economics of reciprocity and identity. That is, what we find when
we look at the different forms of social identity is that how we understand rationality depends
upon how rationality is endogenous to individuals’ social circumstances. That is, what counts as
rational is not something we can determine in and of itself, axiomatically, and apart from how we
understand the identity of individuals, especially in connection with their social identity side.
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This then returns us to the question of how individuals with different social identities also have
personal identities associated with ‘who’ it is that has those different social identities. The
discussion above tells us that relational and categorical social identities mean different things to
individuals, implying that they contribute to personal identity differently. Though there are
many ways this issue can be approached, one view is that individuals’ personal identities depend
on how they use their relational social identities to organize and interpret their categorical social
identities (Davis, 2011, 201ff). That is, their closer connections to others in their positions and
roles are a key to their approach to their more distant connections to others in large social groups.
This makes personal identity first and foremost relational in nature. To show how such a view
might be developed, two different recent accounts of personal identity treated as relational in
nature, both of which emphasize social identity and reciprocity, are the subject of the next
section.

3. Two views of personal identity as relational in nature
Michael Bacharach (2006) develops a game-theoretic conception of the single individual as a
being who possesses multiple selves which function together as a team. When individuals are
faced with a choice of action, Bacharach argues that rather than seeing the person asking, ‘what
should I do?’ we ought to see the person’s multiple selves asking, ‘what should we do?’ On his
view, an individual’s multiple selves are simply all the person’s social identities, so that we have
a sub-personal self for each social identity we have. This is central to Bacharach’s account of
why the personal identity of the individual can be understood as a team, because having a social
identity (he primarily means categorical social identity) is akin to having membership in a team.
Thus, just as one’s many social identity selves each identify with the teams/social identities to
which they belong, so they also have the same capacity to identity with the team made up of the
single person to which they belong. This makes the individual’s personal identity explicitly
relational in nature in that what makes the individual a single distinct person is the relations they
have to others through their identification with them in social groups. For comparison, it is a
different kind of view from one that says individuals may act on team preferences (Sugden,
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2000) – a kind of social preference – since these views attribute such preferences to a unitary
individual rather than make the individual itself a team.
Another view of personal identity as relational in nature derives from collective intentionality
theory (e.g, Searle, 1995; Gilbert, 1989; Tuomela and Miller, 1988). Collective intentionality
theory examines the behavior individuals when their intentions are formed in social settings and
expressed in first person plural ‘we’ language rather than in first person singular ‘I’ language.
An important difference between ‘we’ intentions and ‘I’ intentions concerns their conditions of
success. To successfully express an ‘I’ intention, a person needs to use language correctly to
communicate that intention. In the case of ‘we’ intentions, however, not only must this be true,
but those to whom this is expressed must agree with the content of the intention since the ‘we’
binds them as well to what has been said (Davis, 2002). Thus, a person fails to successfully
express a ‘we’ intention about something if those to whom it applies reject what has been said.
Individuals, of course, regularly express ‘we’ intentions, as shown by the cross-language nature
of this form of speech. Thus at least a part of what is involved in being an individual is a matter
of being embedded in relationships to others where collective intentions operate. Note, then,
when individuals express ‘we’ intentions, they make what others want part of what they want, so
that their own identities are partially relational in nature. At the same time, they do so in a noninstrumentally rational way, since in the expression of a ‘we’ intention one is (deontologically)
obliged to put things in a way to which others will agree for that ‘we’ intention to be successful,
quite apart from one’s preferences. The choice to express a ‘we’ intention could be understood
in an instrumentally rational manner, but the actual expression of it must be non-instrumentally
rational.
For both Bacharach and collective intentionality theory, then, individuals’ personal identities can
be understood to have a relational character. However, the degree of this relationality is not
same, as reflected in the different kinds of social identities involved. Bacharach is largely
though not exclusively concerned with categorical social identities which typically involve
considerable social distance between individuals and those with whom they identify. Collective
intentionality theory, at least as developed around the logic of success conditions for ‘we’
intentions, makes a person’s contact with others central, and accordingly puts more emphasis on
7

relational social identity. We may consequently distinguish between these two ways of talking
about personal identity as relational according to the different kinds of reciprocity associated
with these different kinds of social identity. Bacharach’s view better fits instrumentally rational
or conditional reciprocity, while collective intentionality theory better fits non-instrumental
rational or unilateral reciprocity. More could be said about this basic distinction, but for
comparative purposes, the following section turns to what this might tell us about the implicit
view of personal identity in the standard Homo economicus view of the individual.

4. The personal identity of Homo economicus
Though standard economics does not employ the concept of personal identity, it is fair to say that
it identifies individuals with their utility functions or as collections of well-ordered preferences
defined in terms of a set of axiomatic assumptions ascribed to those preferences. However,
much experimental research over the last decade has cast doubt on whether these assumptions
have a sound empirical basis (cf. Starmer, 2000). If these assumptions do not hold, or if they
require significant revision, then it becomes unclear whether they can still support a unique
monotonic utility function which would represent individuals’ personal identities. In addition to
this problem, there is an even more serious problem with the utility function representation of
individuals’ personal identities. Individuals’ preferences are also always assumed to be their
own preferences and not someone else’s. Indeed, two people could have identical preferences,
but on the standard view would be two different people because those preferences in each case
would still be their own. This means, then, that the definition of the individual as a single
distinct being is circular, because it makes individuals’ identities depend on having their own
preferences. Having an ‘own’ set of preferences accordingly does not distinguish and identify an
individual, but rather counts as a formal procedure for mapping given preference ranking
information into a choice space for whoever or whatever is to be called an ‘individual’ (person,
firm, nation, neural process, etc.) to which those preferences belong. As Gerhard Debreu aptly
put it, “an axiomatized theory has a mathematical form that is completely separated from its
economic content” (Debreu, 1986, p. 1265).
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The utility function conception of the individual, then, fails as an account of an individual’s
personal identity. Since the circularity problem is at the root of this, it makes sense to ask how
one would go about explaining personal identity in a way that avoids this problem. That would
involve describing the individual in a manner that does not presuppose the individual, that is, in
terms of characteristics that do not refer to or imply the individual, as in the case of having an
own set of preferences. There are different ways in which this can be done (cf. Davis, 2011), but
one element that can profitably be drawn upon is patterns of relationships between people, as in
the two relational views of identity set out above. The basic idea is that patterns of relationships
between people can individualize particular persons if they occupy distinct locations in these
patterns. The advantage of this approach is that reference to ‘patterns of relationships between
people’ does not presuppose any particular individuals who might be identified by those patterns,
and thus potentially makes it possible to distinguish them out as individuals in a non-circular
way. Explaining individuals’ personal identities in this way would then also make it possible to
investigate how individuals’ personal identities could be seen to evolve over time as individuals’
social relationships change. This allows for a variety of views of what individual personal
identity involves alternative to the standard Homo economicus conception, and as the discussion
here has argued provides additional foundations for explaining behavior in connection with such
phenomena as reciprocity.
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